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Free trade agreements (FTAs) have been a feature
of the international trade landscape for decades.
Their rapid proliferation over the course of the
still-incomplete World Trade Organization (WTO)
Doha Round of negotiations has given rise to concerns that such agreements are stumbling blocks
rather than stepping stones along the path to further multilateral trade liberalization. The difficulties identified with FTAs include that they divert
capital and human resources away from negotiating in the WTO; they make concluding the Doha
Round more challenging because they often
exclude sensitive sectors such as agriculture, leaving the most difficult areas to liberalize on the
WTO table without the easier concessions left as a
sweetener; and that FTA dispute settlement poses
a risk of fragmenting international trade jurisprudence by reaching decisions inconsistent with
those reached by WTO panels and the Appellate
Body. Such concerns are more driven by the sheer
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volume of FTAs than by any individual agreement, per se. Indeed, FTAs have, until recently,
had a number of similarities. First, with a few
exceptions, FTAs have primarily tracked the WTO
in terms of subject coverage, with new areas, if
any, generally limited to hortatory, “best endeavors” language and excluded from dispute settlement. Second, FTAs have been overwhelmingly
bilateral (treating the EU as one). And third, FTAs
have sometimes combined a large economy with
a smaller economy, and sometimes two smaller
economies with each other, but the largest
economies were not forming FTAs with each
other. Thus no one FTA captured a particularly
large percentage of world trade. There have been
striking changes, however, in the past few years,
with several “mega” FTAs now under negotiation. These include the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), the Trans-Atlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP), the China-JapanKorea FTA (CJK), and the EU-Japan FTA. The new
mega-FTAs have a number of implications – in
addition to those identified above – for global
governance. This piece will focus on the TPP and
the RCEP, with some references to other megaFTAs as appropriate. It will first briefly describe
the TPP and the RCEP in the context of a new
generation of mega-FTAs, and second, discuss
three implications of the new mega-FTAs for
global governance: the lack of developing country
participation; the potential for inconsistencies in
dispute settlement outcomes; and the challenges
of returning to the WTO negotiating table.
I. Features of the Mega-FTAs
The new mega-FTAs differ from their twentieth
century counterparts in a number of respects.
First, these agreements are linking large
economies with each other for the first time. The
United States is negotiating with the EU in the
TTIP; Japan and the United States are negotiating
together in the TPP; Japan, China and Korea are
negotiating together in CJK and the RCEP; and
Japan and the EU are negotiating a bilateral FTA.
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Second, some of the agreements are linking a
large number of countries: the RCEP negotiations
include 16 countries, and the TPP comprises 12
countries. Third, each of these negotiations is capturing a much higher percentage of global GDP
than any previous FTA. The TTIP is estimated to
encompass 37 percent of world GDP; the TPP will
account for 31.5 percent; and the RCEP for 30 percent. Fourth, some of these agreements – particularly the TTIP and the TPP – are addressing new
issues such as regulatory coherence, competition,
and state-owned enterprises.
A. The TPP
The TPP negotiations have their origins in the
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement entered into by Brunei, Chile, New
Zealand, and Singapore in 2005. This agreement,
known colloquially as the P-4 Trade Agreement or
just “P-4,” was an effort by its members to create
a high standards agreement that would serve as a
model for a future FTA of the Asia-Pacific (Lewis
2009; 2011). The P-4 countries committed to bringing tariffs to zero on all tariff lines – a marked difference from most FTAs, in which agriculture and
other sensitive sectors are generally excluded in
whole or in large part from liberalization commitments. The P-4 also features an open accession
clause, which permits other countries to accede to
the agreement subject to the approval of the existing members.
The P-4 provided that, two years after coming
into force, additional negotiations would commence to broaden the scope of the agreement to
include financial services and investment. At the
time those additional negotiations were about to
start, the United States indicated its interest in
observing the negotiations. Officials from the
United States Trade Representative office made it
known that if they found the negotiations of sufficient interest, they would seek to join the agreement. When that statement of interest became
public, Australia, Peru, Malaysia, and Vietnam
quickly indicated they would also like to participate. Shortly thereafter, the original P-4 countries
plus the five newcomers formed a nine-country
negotiating group.
1

The United States signaled that the countries
would be negotiating a new trade agreement, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, rather than the newcomers acceding to the P-4. Nonetheless, the TPP’s
origins clearly lie in the P-4. From the start, the
TPP has been touted as a “twenty-first century
trade agreement” (United States Trade Representative; Lim, Elms and Low 2012). The negotiations
began with the premise that there would be no per
se market access exclusions. In addition, the
breadth of the agreement is broad, with several
chapters covering topics not included within the
scope of the WTO, including state-owned enterprises, investment, and regulatory coherence.
In 2012 and 2013, Canada, Mexico, and Japan
joined the negotiations bringing the total parties
to 12. While it now seems likely that a few sensitive products will be excluded from meaningful
market access commitments, the TPP will
nonetheless feature a range of commitments not
found in other FTAs.
B. The RCEP
The RCEP is a negotiation that combines the ten
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) with six countries that already
have “+1” FTAs with ASEAN – China, Japan,
Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. 1
Because ASEAN already has “hub and spoke”
FTAs with each of the +1 countries, the real trade
gains from the RCEP will result from new linkages amongst the spokes – i.e. from the +1 countries linking with each other. In particular, China,
Japan, and Korea are currently negotiating an
FTA (“C-J-K”) which will facilitate the RCEP
negotiations. The RCEP is, however, more significant as a geostrategic matter rather than as a trade
agreement. While the RCEP is not expected to be
particularly novel as a trade agreement, it is of
strategic importance that Japan, China, and Korea
– countries with a long history of chilly relations –
will come together and bring their economic and
political power to this 16-country collaboration.
The RCEP can also be viewed as China’s answer
to the TPP. While the TPP and RCEP have seven
countries in common, China is only in the RCEP
and the United States is only in the TPP.

Australia and New Zealand negotiated collectively in forming an FTA with ASEAN, thus their agreement is also considered a “+ ”
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II. Implications of the New Mega-FTAs for
Global Governance
The new mega-FTAs such as the TPP, RCEP, and
TTIP have many implications that extend beyond
the reaches of the agreements themselves to the
global trading community. Below I highlight three
such implications.
A. Legitimacy Concerns due to Lack of Developing Countries
As noted above, the new mega-FTAs are linking
large developed economies for the first time. This
will concentrate a significant degree of economic
might in each agreement. To the extent the negotiations are covering new issues, it is likely that the
global rules of the future will emerge from megaFTA negotiations. This is particularly true for the
TTIP and TPP processes, which have more ambitious negotiating agendas than the RCEP. If the
mega-FTAs do indeed give rise to the rules and
standards of the future, some may find this outcome raises legitimacy concerns. While the TTIP
and TPP both comprise large shares of world
GDP, most of the world’s countries are excluded
from these FTA negotiations with poorer developing countries the most notably absent. Developing countries are therefore likely to be asked to
adopt standards established in TTIP and/or the
TPP, without having had any opportunity to have
input into those rules.
B. Potential for Dispute Settlement Inconsistencies
To the extent mega-FTAs include chapters and
other provisions that go beyond the scope of the
WTO, there is an increased potential for inconsistent dispute settlement rulings. For countries that
have formed FTAs that largely mirror the WTO in
coverage, the parties have generally opted to take
their disputes to the WTO rather than to the FTA
dispute settlement mechanism. This choice may
not be available for certain disputes arising out of
the new mega-FTAs, however. If a dispute
involves a commitment that does not overlap
with the WTO – for example, an issue relating to
state-owned enterprises – that dispute cannot be
said to be covered by the WTO agreements, and a
WTO dispute settlement panel would likely
decline to resolve the dispute. Thus such disputes
would need to be brought to FTA dispute settlement. Where the risk of conflicting decisions aris-
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es is if the disputes involving FTA-only issues
also involve issues with WTO overlap, such as
alleged breaches of the most-favored nation obligation or national treatment. It is unlikely that parties would bring two separate disputes, one in the
WTO and one within the FTA dispute settlement
process. Instead, the FTA arbiters will end up
resolving issues that would in the past have been
resolved within the WTO. Conflicting decisions
are not inevitable, but do become more likely
with mega-FTAs.
C. Increases Difficulty in Returning to WTO
Negotiating Table
A final implication the mega-FTAs have for global
governance is their impact on the participants’
willingness to engage at the WTO negotiating
table. In the past, while FTAs posed challenges for
the WTO, at least the major economies saw the
WTO as the forum in which they could obtain
trade concessions from each other. Now, however,
with the U.S. partnering with Japan in the TPP
and Europe in the TTIP; Europe and Japan forming their own FTA; and China, Japan, and Korea
linking in the RCEP and the C-J-K FTA, the big
players are obtaining important market opportunities from each other outside the WTO framework. This dynamic suggests that it is going to be
even harder, going forward, to get the WTO’s
largest economies to see enough potential benefits
to return to the multilateral negotiating table.
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